I shall argue that a resolution of the PvNP problem requires building an iff bridge between the domain of provability and that of computability. The former concerns how a human intelligence decides the truth of number-theoretic relations, and is formalised by the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA following Dededekind's axiomatisation of Peano's Postulates. The latter concerns how a human intelligence computes the values of number-theoretic functions, and is formalised by the operations of a Turing Machine following Turing's analysis of computable functions. I shall show that such a bridge requires objective definitions of both an 'algorithmic' interpretation of PA, and an 'instantiational' interpretation of PA. I shall show that both interpretations are implicit in the definition of the subjectively defined 'standard' interpretation of PA. However the existence of, and distinction between, the two objectively definable interpretations-and the fact that the former is sound whilst the latter is not-is obscured by the extraneous presumption under the 'standard' interpretation of PA that Aristotle's particularisation must hold over the structure N of the natural numbers. I shall argue that recognising the falseness of this belief awaits a paradigm shift in our perception of the application of Tarski's analysis (of the concept of truth in the languages of the deductive sciences) to the 'standard' interpretation of PA. I shall then show that an arithmetical formula [F ] is PA-provable if, and only if, [F ] interprets as true under an algorithmic interpretation of PA. I shall finally show how it then follows from Gödel's construction of a formally 'undecidable' arithmetical proposition that there is a Halting-type PA formula which-by Tarski's definitions-is algorithmically verifiable as true, but not algorithmically computable as true, under a sound interpretation of PA.
Introduction
I define what it means for a number-theoretic function to be:
(i) Instantiationally computable;
(ii) Algorithmically computable.
I argue that P =NP if a number-theoretic function is instantiationally computable but not algorithmically computable.
I then show in Lemma 10 below that if Aristotle's particularisation is presumed valid over the structure N of the natural numbers-as is the case under the standard interpretation of PA-then it follows from the instantiational nature of the constructive definition of the Gödel β-function 1 that a primitive recursive relation can be instantiationally equivalent to an arithmetical relation where the former is algorithmically computable as always true over N whilst the latter is instantiationally computable, but not algorithmically computable, as always true over N .
I note that this argument cannot be formalised in ZF since functions are defined extensionally as mappings. Hence ZF cannot recognise that a primitive recursive relation may be instantiationally equivalent to, but computationally different from, an arithmetical relation where the former is algorithmically computable as always true over N whilst the latter is instantiationally computable, but not algorithmically computable, as always true over N .
I therefore conclude in Theorem 1 that, if the standard interpretation of PA is presumed sound, then P =NP.
I then consider an algorithmic interpretation of PA that yields P =NP in Theorem 7, but which does not appeal to Aristotle's particularisation and which is provably sound.
The PvNP problem
In a 2009 survey of the status of the P versus NP problem, Lance Fortnow wrote 2 :
". . . in the mid-1980's, many believed that the quickly developing area of circuit complexity would soon settle the P versus NP problem, whether every algorithmic problem with efficiently verifiable solutions have efficiently computable solutions. But circuit complexity and other approaches to the problem have stalled and we have little reason to believe we will see a proof separating P from NP in the near future.
. . . As we solve larger and more complex problems with greater computational power and cleverer algorithms, the problems we cannot tackle begin to stand out. The theory of NP-completeness helps us understand these limitations and the P versus NP problems begins to loom large not just as an interesting theoretical question in computer science, but as a basic principle that permeates all the sciences.
. . . None of us truly understand the P versus NP problem, we have only begun to peel the layers around this increasingly complex question."
Equivalent definitions of P, NP and P =NP
The formal definition of the class P by Stephen Cook 3 admits a number-theoretic function F -viewed set-theoretically as defining (and defined by) a unique subset L of the set Σ * of finite strings over some non-empty finite alphabet set Σ-in P if, and only if, some deterministic Turing machine TM accepts L and runs in polynomial time.
In this investigation I interpret number-theoretic functions and relations over an infinite domain D as pre-Cantorian computational instructions (which may, or may not, be uniform) that, for any given sequence of allowable values to the variables in the function/relation, determine how the function/relation is to be evaluated-and whether, or not, the result of such evaluation yields a value (or values)-in the domain D. I do not assume-as in Cantorian set theories-that the evaluations always determine a completed infinity (set) that can be referred to as a unique mathematical constant that identifies the function/relation in a mathematical language (or its interpretation) outside of the set theory in which the function/relation is defined.
Fortnow describes the PvNP problem informally as follows:
"In 1965, Jack Edmonds . . . suggested a formal definition of "efficient computation" (runs in time a fixed polynomial of the input size).
The class of problems with efficient solutions would later become known as P for "Polynomial Time".
. . . But many related problems do not seem to have such an efficient algorithm.
. . . The collection of problems that have efficiently verifiable solutions is known as NP (for "Nondeterministic Polynomial-Time" . . . ).
So P=NP means that for every problem that has an efficiently verifiable solution, we can find that solution efficiently as well.
. . . If a formula φ is not a tautology, we can give an easy proof of that fact by exhibiting an assignment of the variables that makes φ false. But if . . . there are no short proofs of tautology that would imply P =NP."
In an earlier paper presented to ICM 2002, Ran Raz explains 4 :
"A Boolean formula f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is a tautology if f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = 1 for every x 1 , . . . , x n . A Boolean formula f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is unsatisfiable if f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = 0 for every x 1 , . . . , x n . Obviously, f is a tautology if and only if ¬f is unsatisfiable.
Given a formula f (x 1 , . . . , x n ), one can decide whether or not f is a tautology by checking all the possibilities for assignments to x 1 , . . . , x n . However, the time needed for this procedure is exponential in the number of variables, and hence may be exponential in the length of the formula f . However, as L. E. J. Brouwer pointed out in a seminal 1908 paper 11 , the presumption that Aristotle's particularisation holds over N lies beyond our common intuition. In the rest of the investigation I therefore consider whether the above conclusion would persist under any sound interpretation of PA.
We may express Aristotle's particularisation in a contemporary context as:
From an assertion such as: 5 cf. [Go31] , p.29: Every recursive relation is arithmetical. 6 The symbol '[∃ 1 ]' denotes uniqueness, in the sense that the PA formula [(∃ 1 x 3 )F (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 )] is a short-hand notation for the PA formula [¬(∀x 3 )¬F (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) ∧ (∀y)(∀z)(F (x 1 , x 2 , y) ∧ F (x 1 , x 2 , z) → y = z)].
7 See Section 5.1. I shall follow Alfred Tarski's terminology and definitions of the satisfaction and truth of the formulas of a formal language under an interpretation as detailed in Section 5.
8 Notation: The asterisk indicates that the expression is to be interpreted semantically with respect to some well-defined interpretation. I shall aim to use this notation consistently in this investigation.
9 [HA28] , pp.58-59. 10 See Appendix A, Section 10 for the meaning and usage of the symbol denoting the existential quantifier in an interpretation.
11 [Br08] .
'It is not the case that, for any given x, any witness 12 W D of a domain D can decide that P * (x) does not hold in D', usually denoted symbolically by '¬(∀x)¬P * (x)', we may always validly infer that:
'There exists an unspecified x such that any witness W D of D can decide that P * (x) holds in D', usually denoted symbolically by '(∃x)P * (x)'.
I note that, prima facie, Brouwer's objection seems valid since Aristotle's particularisation does not hold if we take D as the domain of the natural numbers and the witness W N as a Turing machine, since P * (x) may be a Halting-type of number-theoretic relation.
Thus, to ensure that the arguments of this investigation are intuitionistically unobjectionable, any assumption that the 'standard' interpretation I P A(N , Standard) of PA is sound shall be explicit.
Defining instantiational computability and algorithmic computability
We introduce the two concepts 13 :
15 is instantiationally computable if, and only if, there is a Turing machine TM that, for any given sequence of numerals [(a 1 , . . . , a n )], will accept the natural number input m if m is a unique identification number of the formula [F (a 1 , . . . , a n )], and will always then halt with one of the following as output:
. . , a n )] computes as 0 (or interprets as true) in N ;
(ii) 1 if [F (a 1 , . . . , a n )] computes as 1 (or interprets as false) in N .
Definition 2 Algorithmic computability: A Boolean number-theoretic function [F (x 1 , . . . , x n )] is algorithmically computable if, and only if, there is a Turing machine TM F that, for any given sequence of numerals [(a 1 , . . . , a n )], will accept the natural number input m if, and only if, m is a unique identification number of the formula [F (a 1 , . . . , a n )], and will always then halt with one of the following as output:
The set of identification numbers m thus corresponds to the set-theoretically defined language L accepted by TM F in Cook's definition of the class P. 12 The word 'witness' is intended to be construed broadly in its usual dictionary sense, and not as a specifically defined technical term. However, see Section 5 for a more specific sense of the term 'witness' as used in this investigation.
13 My thanks to Dr. Chaitanya H. Mehta for advising that the focus of this investigation should be the distinction between these two concepts.
14 Strictly speaking, a formula of a formal language that interprets as a Boolean numbertheoretic function under a well-defined interpretation of the language.
15 I shall use square brackets to differentiate a formal expression such as [F (a 1 , . . . , an)] from its interpretation F * (x 1 , . . . , xn). See Appendix A, Section 10 for the notation and definitions of standard terms as used in this investigation.
It is reasonable to assume that the following thesis will hold when the concepts "efficiently verifiable" and "efficiently computable" are formalised in any formal system of Arithmetic: Lemma 1 is intended to highlight the fact that the definition of a tautology only requires that a Boolean number-theoretic function f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) be computable instantiationally as always true; unless we presume the Church-Turing Thesis, it does not require that f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) be partial recursive, and therefore computable algorithmically as always true.
I shall argue in Section 8 that (as in the case of interpretations of PA in Section 5) it is an implicit belief in the plausibility of-or informal reliance upon 16 -the Church-Turing Thesis that obscures the distinction between 'instantiational' computability and 'algorithmic' computability.
The question thus arises: Is there a Halting-type PA formula [F (x 1 , . . . , x n )] that is computable instantiationally, but not algorithmically, as always true under a sound interpretation of PA?
Is there a Halting-type tautology?
To place this query in perspective I note that:
Lemma 2 If PA has a sound interpretation I P A(N , Sound) over N , then any PA-provable formula [F (x 1 , . . . , x n )] is instantiationally computable as always true over N under I P A(N , Sound) .
Proof Gödel has shown how we can algorithmically assign a unique natural (Gödel) number to each PA formula and to each finite sequence of PA formulas 17 . Gödel has also shown how we can construct a primitive recursive relation xBy 18 that holds if, and only if, x is the Gödel number of a proof sequence in PA, and y is the Gödel number of the last formula of the sequence. Now, if the PA formula [F (x 1 , . . . , x n )] is PA-provable then, for any given sequence of numerals [(a 1 , . . . , a n )], the PA formula [F (a 1 , . . . , a n )] is PA-provable. 16 See, for instance, [Rg87] , p.21, "Almost all the proofs in this book will use Church's Thesis to some extent".
17 [Go31] , p.13.
Hence xB⌈[F (a 1 , . . . , a n )]⌉ 19 always holds for some x. Since xBy is recursive, there is a Turing machine TM B that will accept m if m is ⌈ [F (a 1 , . . . , a n )]⌉ and halt with output 'provable'.
Since a PA-provable formula is true under I P A(N , Sound) , the lemma follows. 2
Although the following argument is informal, a formal proof follows immediately from Section 6.2, where I show in Theorem 4 that an algorithmic interpretation I P A(N , Algorithmic) of PA-under which a PA-provable formula is algorithmically computable as always true over N -is sound.
Lemma 3 If PA has a sound interpretation I P A(N , Sound) over N , then any PA-provable formula [F (x 1 , . . . , x n )] is algorithmically computable as always true over N .
Proof If a PA formula [F (x 1 , . . . , x n )] is PA-provable, then there is a finite proof sequence in PA whose last member is [F (x 1 , . . . , x n )]. Under any sound interpretation of PA over N this sequence must 20 interpret as an algorithm (program) of fixed size that, for any sequence [(a 1 , . . . , a n )] of PA numerals, decides [F (a 1 , . . . , a n )] as true. This algorithm defines a Turing machine TM F that, for any natural number sequence (a 1 , . . . , a n ), will:
(i) accept the natural number m if, and only if, m is the Gödel number of [F (a 1 , . . . , a n )];
(ii) halt on any such input m with output 'true'. Now it follows in any system of Gödel numbering such as that defined by Gödel in his seminal 1931 paper on formally undecidable arithmetical proposi-
, where c(a 1 , . . . , an) is a constant whose value is determined by the sequence (a 1 , . . . , an). 
references the values of a putative β(u (x 1 ,x 2 ) , v (x 1 ,x 2 ) , i) which would represent the sequence f (x 1 , 0), f (x 1 , 1), . . . , f (x 1 , x 2 ) for unspecified x 1 , x 2 over N .
The thesis that I shall seek to address formally in this investigation 25 is thus:
Thesis 2 Under any sound interpretation of PA, Gödel's [R(x)] is instantiationally computable, but not algorithmically computable, as always true in N .
Moreover, I shall seek to show why-as Fortnow appears to suggest-resolving the PvNP problem may not be the major issue; the harder part may be altering our attitudes and beliefs so that we can see what is obstructing such a resolution.
Bridging provability and computability

In a 1956 letter
26 to John von Neumann, Gödel raised an issue of computational complexity that is commonly accepted as a precursor of the PvNP problem: 22 Gödel refers to this formula only by its Gödel number r ([Go31], p.25 (12) ). 23 Gödel's aim in [Go31] One can obviously easily construct a Turing machine, which for every formula F in first order predicate logic and every natural number n, allows one to decide if there is a proof of F of length n (length = number of symbols). Let Ψ(F, n) be the number of steps the machine requires for this and let φ(n) = max F Ψ(F, n). The question is how fast φ(n) grows for an optimal machine. One can show that φ(n) ≥ K.n. If there really were a machine with f (n) ≈ K.n (or even ≈ K.n 2 ), this would have consequences of the greatest importance. Namely, it would obviously mean that in spite of the undecidability of the Entscheidungsproblem, the mental work of a mathematician concerning Yes-or-No questions could be completely replaced by a machine. After all, one would simply have to choose the natural number n so large that when the machine does not deliver a result, it makes no sense to think more about the problem. Now it seems to me, however, to be completely within the realm of possibility that φ(n) grows that slowly.
Since it seems that φ(n) = K.n is the only estimation which one can obtain by a generalization of the proof of the undecidability of the Entscheidungsproblem and after all φ(n) ≈ K.n (or ≈ K.n 2 ) only means that the number of steps as opposed to trial and error can be reduced from N to log N (or (log N ) 2 ). However, such strong reductions appear in other finite problems, for example in the computation of the quadratic residue symbol using repeated application of the law of reciprocity. It would be interesting to know, for instance, the situation concerning the determination of primality of a number and how strongly in general the number of steps in finite combinatorial problems can be reduced with respect to simple exhaustive search.
Clearly issues of computational complexity-such as those raised by Gödel above-are finitary concerns involving number-theoretic functions and relations containing quantification over N that lie naturally within the domains of: (a) First-order Peano Arithmetic PA, which attempts to capture in a formal language the objective essence of how a human intelligence intuitively reasons about number-theoretic predicates, and; (b) Computability Theory, which attempts to capture in a formal language the objective essence of how a human intelligence intuitively computes number-theoretic functions.
Moreover, since Gödel had already shown in 1931 that every recursive relation can be expressed arithmetically 27 , his formulation of the computational complexity of a number-theoretic problem in terms of formal arithmetical provability suggests that we ought to persist in seeking, conversely, an algorithmic interpretation of first-order PA 28 in Computability Theory, so that any numbertheoretic problem can be expressed-and addressed-formally in PA, and its solution, if any, interpreted algorithmically in Computability Theory. I investigate this in detail in Section 5.
Gödel's Theorem V and formally unprovable but interpretively true propositions
Now, by Gödel's Theorem V 29 , every recursive relation f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) can be expressed in PA by a formula [F (x 1 , . . . , x n )] such that, for any given n-tuple of natural numbers a 1 , . . . , a n : If f (a 1 , . . . , a n ) is true, then PA proves [F (a 1 , . . . , a n )]
If ¬f (a 1 , . . . , a n ) is true, then PA proves [¬F (a 1 , . . . , a n )]
Gödel relies only on the above to conclude-in his Theorem VI 30 -the existence of an arithmetical proposition that is formally unprovable in a Peano Arithmetic, but true under a sound interpretation of the Arithmetic.
However, I now show that it is Gödel's Theorem VII 31 which-for recursive relations of the form x 0 = φ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) defined by the Recursion Rule 32 -provides an actual blueprint for the construction of PA formulas that are PAunprovable, but true under the standard interpretation of PA.
Moreover, I shall show that this Gödelian characteristic is merely a reflection of the fact that, by the instantiational nature of their constructive definition in terms of Gödel's β-function, such formulas are designed to be instantiationally computable, but not algorithmically computable, under the standard interpretation of PA.
Every recursive function is representable in PA
I note some standard definitions and results (which implicitly presume 33 that the standard interpretation of PA is sound, hence quantifiers are interpreted under the assumption that Aristotle's particularisation is valid over N ).
Gödel has defined a primitive recursive function-Gödel's β-function-as 34 :
where rm(x 1 , x 2 ) denotes the remainder obtained on dividing x 2 by x 1 . Gödel showed that:
Lemma 6 For any non-terminating sequence of values f (x 1 , 0), f (x 1 , 1), . . ., we can construct natural numbers b, c such that:
Proof This is a standard result 35 . We reproduce Gödel's original argument of this critical lemma in an Appendix B, Section 11. 2
Now we have the standard definition 36 : 
(ii) PA proves:
The function f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is said to be strongly representable in PA if we further have that:
We then have:
which is defined as follows:
Proof This is a standard result 37 . 2 Gödel further showed that:
is a recursive function defined by:
where g(x 1 ) and h(x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) are recursive functions of lower rank 38 that are represented in PA by well-formed formulas
Proof This is a standard result 39 . In view of the significance of this lemma for the resolution of the PvNP problem offered in Lemma 10 below, we reproduce Gödel's original argument and proof of the lemma in Appendix B, Section 11.2
What does "[(∃
the standard interpretation of PA?
] is provable in PA; and true under any sound interpretation of PA. We thus have that:
Lemma 9 If we assume that the standard interpretation of PA is sound, then:
is true under the standard interpretation of PA"
is the assertion that:
Given any natural numbers k, m, we can construct natural numbers
where f (x 1 , x 2 ), g(x 1 ) and h(x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) are any recursive functions that are formally represented in PA by F (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ), G(x 1 , x 2 ) and H(x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) respectively such that:
) and h(x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) are recursive functions that are assumed to be of lower rank than f (x 1 , x 2 ).
Proof For any given natural numbers k and m, if [F (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 )] interprets as a well-defined arithmetical relation under the standard interpretation of PA, then a Turing-machine can construct the sequences
, m) and verify the assertion. 2
If the standard interpretation of PA is sound, then P =NP
We now see that:
Lemma 10 If the standard interpretation of PA is sound, then [(∃ 1 x 3 )F (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 )] is computable instantiationally, but not computable algorithmically, as always true over N .
Proof We assume that the standard interpretation of PA is sound (hence we may, for instance, conclude 'There is some x such that . . . ' from the assertion 'It is not the case that for all x it is not the case that . . . ' in the domain N of the interpretation.). It then follows from Lemma 9 that:
is true under the standard interpretation of PA. It then follows from the definition of [F (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 )] in Lemma 8 that, for any given natural numbers k, m, we can construct some pair of natural numbers
are functions of the given natural numbers k and m-such that:
. . for any given natural numbers k and m such that:
We can thus define a Turing machine TM β(u (k,m) ,v (k,m) ,i) that will accept the natural number input g if g is the Gödel number of the PA formula [(∃ 1 x 3 )F (k, m, x 3 )], and then halt with output 'true'.
] is computable instantiationally as always true over N under the standard interpretation of PA.
(2) Now, the pair of natural numbers u (x1,x2) , v (x1,x2) are defined such that:
where v (x1,x2) is defined in Lemma 8 as j! (see Lemma 3.2.1), and:
Since j is not definable for a non-terminating sequence,
We cannot thus define a Turing machine TM β(u (x 1 ,x 2 ) ,v (x 1 ,x2) ,i) that will accept the natural number input g if, and only if, g is the Gödel number of the PA formula [(∃ 1 x 3 )F (k, m, x 3 )], and then halt with output 'true'.
is not computable algorithmically as always true over N under the standard interpretation of PA.
The lemma follows. 2
It follows that:
Theorem 1 If Thesis 1 holds, and the standard interpretation of PA is sound, then P =NP.
Proof By Lemma 10, [(∃ 1 x 3 )F (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 )] is computable instantiationally, but not computable algorithmically, as always true over N . By Lemma 1, P =NP.2
A critical issue that I do not address in this investigation is whether the PA formula [F (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ] can be considered to interpret under a sound interpretation of PA as a well-defined predicate since the denumerable sequences
, mp-where p > 0, and mp is not equal to mq if p is not equal to q-are represented by denumerable, distinctly different, functions β(xp 1 , xp 2 , i) respectively. There are thus denumerable pairs (xp 1 , xp 2 ) for which β(xp 1 , xp 2 , i) yields any given sequence
4 Is Gödel's undecidable arithmetical proposition a one-off anomaly?
It also follows from the preceding section that: Now, the counter-intuitive element in Gödel's conclusions in his 1931 paper has occasionally given rise to the perception that 'undecidable' Gödelian propositions are artificially constructed anomalies which are not likely to be encountered in, or have any appreciable significance for, mainstream mathematics. However, this may not be a realistic perception since the first part of Gödel's Theorem VI 40 is merely a special case of the following theorem:
Theorem 2 If PA is consistent and the PA formula [F (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 )] represents the recursive function f (x 1 , x 2 ), then:
3 )] were PA-provable, then it would be algorithmically computable as true under the standard interpretation of PA. By Lemma 10, this is not the case. The theorem follows.
2
If, further, we assume that the standard interpretation of PA is sound, then it follows from (a) that the second part of Gödel's Theorem VI 41 is a special case of the following:
] is an abbreviation of the PA formula:
Under any sound interpretation of PA over N , the latter formula interprets as the arithmetical relation denoted by:
If the standard interpretation of PA is sound then Aristotle's particularisation holds over N , and this relation can be equivalently denoted by:
However, this is false since (∃x 3 )F * (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) is always true over N by Definition 3. The lemma follows.
We thus have:
Proof The corollary follows from Theorem 2(b) and Lemma 11. 2
The significance of omega-consistency and Hilbert's program
The significance of Corollary 2 is that, in order to avoid intuitionistic objections to his reasoning in [Go31], Gödel did not assume that the standard interpretation of PA is sound. Instead, Gödel introduced the syntactic property of ω-consistency as an explicit assumption in his formal reasoning 42 . Gödel explained at some length 43 that his reasons for introducing ω-consistency as an explicit assumption in his formal reasoning was to avoid appealing to the stronger, semantic, concept of classical arithmetical truth-a concept which is implicitly based on an intuitionistically objectionable logic that assumes Aristotle's particularisation is valid over N .
However, I now show that if we assume the standard interpretation of PA is sound, then PA is consistent if, and only if, it is ω-consistent.
Hilbert's ω-Rule
Assuming that PA has a sound interpretation over N , is it true that:
Algorithmic ω-Rule: If it is proved that the PA formula [F (x)] interprets as an arithmetical relation F * (x) that is algorithmically decidable as true for any given natural number n, then the PA formula [(∀x)F (x)] can be admitted as an initial formula (axiom) in PA?
The significance of this query is that, as part of his program for giving mathematical reasoning a finitary foundation, Hilbert 44 proposed an ω-Rule as a finitary means of extending a Peano Arithmetic to a possible completion (i.e. to logically showing that, given any arithmetical proposition, either the proposition, or its negation, is formally provable from the axioms and rules of inference of the extended Arithmetic):
Hilbert's ω-Rule: If it is proved that the PA formula [F (x)] interprets as an arithmetical relation F * (x) that is true for any given natural number n, then the PA formula [(∀x)F (x)] can be admitted as an initial formula (axiom) in PA. Now, in his 1931 paper-which can, not unreasonably, be seen as the outcome of a presumed attempt to validate Hilbert's ω-rule-Gödel introduced the concept of ω-consistency 45 , from which it follows that:
Lemma 12 If we meta-assume Hilbert's ω-rule for PA, then a consistent PA is necessarily ω-consistent 46 . 2
Proof If the PA formula [F (x)] interprets as an arithmetical relation F * (x) that is true for any given natural number n, and the PA formula [(∀x)F (x)] can be admitted as an initial formula (axiom) in PA, ¬[(∀x)F (x)] cannot be PA-provable if PA is consistent. The lemma follows.
Moreover, it follows from Gödel's 1931 paper that one consequence of assuming Hilbert's ω-Rule is that there must, then, be an undecidable arithmetical proposition 47 ; a further consequence of which is that PA is essentially incomplete.
However, since Gödel's argument in this paper-from which he concludes the existence of an undecidable arithmetical proposition-is based on the weaker (i.e., weaker than assuming Hilbert's ω-rule) premise that a consistent PA can be ω-consistent, the question arises whether an even weaker Algorithmic ω-Rule (which, prima facie, does not imply that a consistent PA is necessarily ω-consistent) can yield a finitary completion for PA as sought by Hilbert, albeit for an ω-inconsistent PA.
Aristotle's particularisation and ω-consistency
I shall now argue that these issues are related, and that placing them in an appropriate perspective requires questioning not only the persisting belief that Aristotle's 2000-year old logic of predicates-a critical component of which is Aristotle's particularisation-remains valid even when applied over an infinite domain such as N , but also the basis of Brouwer's denial of the Law of the Excluded Middle following his challenge of the belief in 1908
48 . Now, we have that:
Lemma 13 If PA is consistent but not ω-consistent, then there is some PA formula [F (x)] such that, under any sound interpretation-say I P A(N , Sound) -of PA over N : 48 [Br08] .
Proof The lemma follows from the definition of ω-consistency and from Tarski's standard definitions 49 of the satisfaction, and truth, of the formulas of a formal system such as PA under an interpretation as detailed in Section 5. Proof The lemma follows from the previous two lemma. 2
In other words 51 :
Corollary 3 If PA is consistent and Aristotle's particularisation holds over N , then PA is ω-consistent. 2
It follows that:
Lemma 17 If Aristotle's particularisation holds over N , then PA is consistent if, and only if, it is ω-consistent.
49 [Ta33] ; see also [Ho01] for an explanatory exposition. However, for standardisation and convenience of expression, I follow the formal exposition of Tarski's definitions given in [Me64] Proof If PA is ω-consistent then, since [n = n] is PA-provable for any given PA numeral [n], we cannot have that [¬(∀x)(x = x)] is PA-provable. Since an inconsistent PA proves [¬(∀x)(x = x)], an ω-consistent PA cannot be inconsistent. 2
The arguments of this section and of the preceding Section 4 thus show that 52 J. Barkley Rosser's 'extension' of Gödel's argument 53 succeeds in avoiding an explicit assumption of ω-consistency only by implicitly appealing to Aristotle's particularisation.
Is PA ω-inconsistent?
Now, it follows from the preceding section that:
Corollary 4 If PA is consistent but not ω-consistent, then Aristotle's particularisation does not hold over N .
As the classical, 'standard', interpretation of PA-say I P A(N , Standard) -appeals to Aristotle's particularisation 54 , it follows that:
Corollary 5 If PA is consistent but not ω-consistent, then the standard interpretation I P A(N , Standard) of PA is not sound, and does not yield a model of PA. 2
Now, formal quantification in computational theory is currently interpretedas in classical logic
55 -so as to admit Aristotle's particularisation over N as axiomatic 56 . However, if Aristotle's particularisation does not hold over N , it would explain to some extent why efforts to resolve the PvNP problem by arguments that appeal to classical Aristotlean logic cannot prevail. Proof It follows from the above definitions that: (a) If, for any given atomic formula [A(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n )] of S, it is decidable by W D whether or not a sequence (a 1 , a 2 , x 2 , . . . , x n )] of S containing n of the logical constants ¬, →, ∀, it is decidable by W D whether or not a sequence (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) of D satisfies [B n (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n )] in D under I S(D) then, for any given compound formula [B (n+1) (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n )] of S containing n + 1 of the logical constants ¬, →, ∀, it is decidable by W D whether or not the sequence (a 1 , a 2 
We thus have that: I now consider the application of Tarski's definitions to various interpretations of first-order Peano Arithmetic PA. I note further that if PA is ω-inconsistent, then Aristotle's particularisation does not hold over N , and the interpretation I P A(N , Standard) is not sound. as 'There is some natural number n such that F (n) holds in N .
The standard interpretation of PA
Gödel's non-standard interpretation of PA
64 [Br08] .
(d) we postulate that SATCON(I P A(Nω ) ) is always decidable by a putative witness W Nω , and that W Nω can, further, determine some numbers in N ω which are not natural numbers;
(e) we assume that PA is ω-consistent.
Clearly, the interpretation I P A(Nω , N on−standard) of a putative ω-consistent PA cannot claim to be finitary. Moreover, if PA is ω-inconsistent, then the Gödelian non-standard interpretation I P A(Nω , N on−standard) of PA is also not sound 65 . Now, if the set-theoretic interpretation I P A(ZF, Cantor) of PA is sound, then every sound interpretation of ZF would, ipso facto, be a sound interpretation of PA. In Appendix C, Section 12 I show, however, that this is not the case, and so the set-theoretic interpretation I P A(ZF, Cantor) of PA is not sound. It follows that I P A(N , Algorithmic) is an algorithmic formulation of the 'standard' interpretation of PA in which we do not extraneously assume that Aristotle's particularisation holds over N .
An instantiational interpretation
I shall show that if I P A(N , Algorithmic) is sound, then PA is not ω-consistent. Hence Aristotle's particularisation does not hold over N , and the interpretation is finitary and intuitionistically unobjectionable. Moreover-since the Law of the Excluded Middle is provable in an ω-inconsistent PA (and therefore holds in N )-it achieves this without the discomforting, stringent, Intuitionistic requirement that we reject the underlying logic of PA! I now show that I P A(N , Algorithmic) is sound, and consider the consequences for the PvNP problem and for Church's Thesis.
The algorithmic interpretation of PA is sound
In Section 5 of this investigation I defined the two interpretations I P A(N , Standard) and I P A(N , Algorithmic) in terms of Tarski's 69 inductive definitions of the satisfaction, and truth, of the formulas of a formal system under an interpretation. It thus follows by induction on k that 70 :
Interpreting quantification
Lemma 21 (Universal:Standard) A Π k PA formula such as [(∀x)A(x)] interprets as true 71 under I P A(N , Standard) if, and only if, for any given natural number n, A * (n) is true in N . is not algorithmically computable as always true in N , but we may not conclude that there exists some natural number n such that A * (n) holds in N 74 .
Proof The lemma follows from the definition of I P A(N , Algorithmic) by induction on k. 2
Interpreting the PA axioms
We note first that:
Lemma 25 The PA axioms PA 1 to PA 8 are algorithmically computable as always true over N under the interpretation I P A(N , Algorithmic) .
are defined recursively 75 , the PA axioms PA 1 to PA 8 interpret as recursive relations that do not involve any quantification. The lemma follows. 2
Further:
Lemma 26 For any given PA formula [F (x)], the Induction axiom schema
Proof By Tarski's Definitions 4 to 9:
72 Note that [(∃x)A(x)] is merely the abbreviation for [¬(∀x)¬A(x)]. 73 Since Aristotle's particularisation is assumed to hold in N under I P A(N , Standard) . 74 Since A * (x) may be a Halting-type of relation such that, for any given natural number n, it is meta-mathematically-even if not algorithmically-decidable that A * (n) is false. As I show in Section 7, Gödel's relation R(x) is precisely such a relation. There is thus a Turing machine TM F such that, for any natural number n, TM F will accept the natural number m if, and only if, m is the Gödel number of [F (n) → F (n ′ )] and will halt with output 'true'.
Since [F (0)] interprets as true under I P A(N , Algorithmic) , it follows that there is a Turing machine TM F ′ such that, for any natural number n, TM F ′ will accept the natural number m if, and only if, m is the Gödel number of [F (n)] and will halt with output 'true'.
Hence [(∀x)F (x)] is algorithmically computable as always true under
Since the above cases are exhaustive, the lemma follows. 2 I note that the interpretation I P A(N , Algorithmic) settles the Poincaré-Hilbert debate 76 in the latter's favour. Poincaré believed that the Induction Axiom could not be justified finitarily, as any such argument would necessarily need to appeal to infinite induction. Hilbert believed that a finitary proof of the consistency of PA was possible.
Similarly:
Lemma 27 Generalisation preserves truth under I P A(N , Algorithmic) .
Proof The two meta-assertions: It is also straightforward to see that:
Lemma 28 Modus Ponens preserves truth under I P A(N , Algorithmic We thus have that:
Lemma 29 The axioms of PA are always true under the finitary interpretation I P A(N , Algorithmic) , and the rules of inference of PA preserve the properties of satisfaction/truth under I P A(N , Algorithmic) . 2
Hence:
Theorem 4 The interpretation I P A(N , Algorithmic) of PA is sound.
We thus have a finitary proof that:
Theorem 5 PA is consistent. Corollary 6 PA is categorical.
By the argument in Theorem 6 it follows that: Proof By Corollary 4 if PA is consistent but not ω-consistent, then Aristotle's particularisation does not hold over N . Since the 'standard', interpretation of PA appeals to Aristotle's particularisation, the lemma follows. 2
Since formal quantification is currently interpreted in classical logic 83 so as to admit Aristotle's particularisation over N as axiomatic 84 , the above suggests that we may need to review number-theoretic arguments 85 that appeal unrestrictedly to classical Aristotlean logic.
The Provability Theorem for PA and Bounded Arithmetic
In a 1997 paper 86 , Samuel R. Buss considered Bounded Arithmetics obtained by: Since we have proven such a Provability Theorem for PA in the previous section, the first question arises:
Does the introduction of bounded quantifiers yield any computational advantage?
Now, one difference
89 between a Bounded Arithmetic and PA is that we can presume in the Bounded Arithmetic that, from a proof of [(∃y)f (n, y)], we may always conclude that there is some numeral [m] such that [f (n, m)] is provable in the arithmetic; however, this is not a sound conclusion in PA.
Reason: Since [(∃y)f (n, y)] is simply a shorthand for [¬(∀y)¬f (n, y)], such a presumption implies that Aristotle's particularisation holds over the natural numbers under any sound interpretation of PA.
To see that (as Brouwer steadfastly held) this may not always be the case, interpret [(∀x)f (x)] as 90 :
There is an algorithm that decides [f (n)] as 'true' for any given numeral [n].
In such case, if [(∀x)(∃y)f (x, y)] is provable in PA, then we can only conclude that:
There is an algorithm that, for any given numeral [n], decides that it is not the case that there is an algorithm that, for any given numeral [m], decides [¬f (n, m)] as 'true'.
We cannot, however, conclude -as we can in a Bounded Arithmetic -that:
There is an algorithm that, for any given numeral [n], decides that there is an algorithm that, for some numeral [m], decides [f (n, m)] as 'true'.
87 See also [Pa71] . 88 See [Bu97] . 89 I suspect the only one. 90 We have seen in the earlier sections that such an interpretation is sound.
Reason: [(∃y)f (n, y)] may be a Halting-type formula for some numeral [n] . This could be the case if [(∀x)(∃y)f (x, y)] were PA-unprovable, but [(∃y)f (n, y)] PA-provable for any given numeral [n] .
Presumably it is the belief that any sound interpretation of PA requires Aristotle's particularisation to hold in N , and the recognition that the latter does not admit linking provability to computability in PA, which has led to considering the effect of bounding quantification in PA.
However, as we have seen in the preceding sections, we are able to link provability to computability through the Provability Theorem for PA by recognising precisely that, to the contrary, any interpretation of PA which requires Aristotle's particularisation to hold in N cannot be sound!
The postulation of an unspecified bound in a Bounded Arithmetic in order to arrive at a provability-computability link thus appears dispensible.
The question then arises:
Does 'weakening' the PA Induction Axiom Schema yield any computational advantage?
Now, Buss considers a bounded arithmetic S 2 which is, essentially, PA with the following 'weakened' Induction Axiom Schema, PIND 91 :
However, PIND can be expressed in first-order Peano Arithmetic PA as follows:
Moreover, the above is a particular case of PIND(k):
Now we have the PA theorem:
It follows that the following is also a PA theorem:
In other words, for any numeral [k], PIND(k) is equivalent in PA to the standard Induction Axiom of PA! Thus, the Provability Theorem for PA suggests that all arguments and conclusions of a Bounded Arithmetic can be reflected in PA without any loss of generality.
Church's Thesis is false
One reason why efforts to prove P=NP remain unsuccessful may lie in recognising that-contrary to accepted dogma 92 -the term 'effective computability' can be precisely defined. For instance, we can define:
⌋ denotes the largest natural number lower bound of the rational 
Recognising instantiational computability as 'effective'
It is significant that Gödel (initially) and Church (subsequently-possibly under the influence of Gödel's disquietitude) enunciated Church's formulation of 'effective computability' as a Thesis because Gödel was instinctively uncomfortable with accepting it as a definition that fully captures the essence of 'intuitive effective computability' 100 . Gödel's reservations seem vindicated if we accept that a number-theoretic function can be computable instantiationally, but not algorithmically.
The possibility that 'truth' may be be 'effectively' decidable instantiationally, but not algorithmically, is implicit in Gödels famous 1951 Gibbs lecture 101 , where he remarks: "I wish to point out that one may conjecture the truth of a universal proposition (for example, that I shall be able to verify a certain property for any integer given to me) and at the same time conjecture that no general proof for this fact exists. It is easy to imagine situations in which both these conjectures would be very well founded. For the first half of it, this would, for example, be the case if the proposition in question were some equation F (n) = G(n) of two number-theoretical functions which could be verified up to very great numbers n." "The computable numbers do not include all (in the ordinary sense) definable numbers. Let P be a sequence whose n-th figure is 1 or 0 according as n is or is not satisfactory. It is an immediate consequence of the theorem of §8 that P is not computable. It is (so far as we know at present) possible that any assigned number of figures of P can be calculated, but not by a uniform process. When sufficiently many figures of P have been calculated, an essentially new method is necessary in order to obtain more figures."
The need for placing such a distinction on a formal basis has also been expressed explicitly on occasion 104 . The reluctance to treat a function such as d(n)-or the function Ω(n) that computes the n th digit in the decimal expression of a Chaitin constant Ω 109 -as computable, on the grounds that the 'time' needed to compute it increases monotonically with n, is curious 110 ; the same applies to any total Turing-computable function f (n) 111 !
Conclusions
I have defined what it means for a number-theoretic function to be:
I then show that:
Conclusion 1 If Aristotle's particularisation is presumed valid over the structure N of the natural numbers-as is the case under the standard interpretation of PA-then it follows from the instantiational nature of the constructive definition of the Gödel β-function that a primitive recursive relation can be instantiationally equivalent to an arithmetical relation where the former is algorithmically computable as always true over N whilst the latter is instantiationally computable, but not algorithmically computable, as always true over N .
I then show that:
Conclusion 2 I P A(N , Standard) is sound if, and only if, Aristotle's particularisation holds over N ; and the latter is the case if, and only if, PA is ω-consistent. 107 The issue here seems to be that, when using language to express the abstract objects of our individual, and common, mental 'concept spaces', we use the word 'exists' loosely in three senses, without making explicit distinctions between them (see [An07] ). 108 [BBJ03] , p.37. 109 Chaitin's Halting Probability is given by 0 < Ω = 2 −|p| < 1, where the summation is over all self-delimiting programs p that halt, and |p| is the size in bits of the halting program p; see [Ct75] . 110 The incongruity of this is addressed by Parikh in [Pa71] . 111 The only difference being that, in the latter case, we know there is a common 'program' of constant length that will compute f (n) for any given natural number n; in the former, we know we may need distinctly different programs for computing f (n) for different values of n, where the length of the program will, sometime, reference n.
Under the standard interpretation I P A(N , Standard) of PA over the domain N , if [A] is an atomic formula [A(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n )] of PA, then the sequence of natural numbers (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) satisfies [A] if, and only if A * (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) holds in N and we presume that Aristotle's particularisation is valid over N .
I have now shown that:
Conclusion 3 We can define a sound interpretation I P A(N , Algorithmic) of PA over the domain N where, if [A] is an atomic formula [A(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n )] of PA, then the sequence of natural numbers (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) satisfies [A] if, and only if [A(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n )] is algorithmically computable under I P A(N , Algorithmic) , but we do not presume that Aristotle's particularisation is valid over N .
It follows that:
Conclusion 4 PA is consistent. 
Conclusion 6 PA is categorical. Since the above imples that Gödel's formula [R(x)] is computable instantiationally but not algorithmically as true over N , I conclude that:
Conclusion 8 (i) P =NP;
(ii) the Church and Turing Theses do not hold? 10 Appendix A: Notation, Definitions and Comments
Notation In this investigation I use square brackets to indicate that the contents represent a symbol or a formula of a formal theory, generally assumed to be well-formed unless otherwise indicated by the context.
In other words, expressions inside the square brackets are to be only viewed syntactically as juxtaposition of symbols that are to be formed and manipulated upon strictly in accordance with specific rules for such formation and manipulation-in the manner of a mechanical or electronic device-without any regards to what the symbolism might represent semantically under an interpretation that gives them meaning.
Moreover, even though the formula '[F (x)]' of a formal Arithmetic may interpret as the arithmetical relation expressed by 'F * (x)', the formula '[(∃x)R(x)]' need not interpret as the arithmetical proposition denoted by the usual abbreviation '(∃x)R * (x).' The latter denotes the phrase 'There is some x such that R * (x)'. As Brouwer had noted 112 , this concept is not always capable of an unambiguous meaning that can be represented in a formal language by the formula '[(∃x)R(x)]' which, in a formal language, is merely an abbreviation for the formula '[¬(∀x)¬R(x)]'.
By 'expressed' I mean here that the symbolism is simply a short-hand abbreviation for referring to abstract concepts that may, or may not, be capable of a precise 'meaning'. Amongst these are symbolic abbreviations which are intended to express the abstract concepts-particularly those of 'existence'-involved in propositions that refer to non-terminating processes and infinite aggregates. 112 [Br08] ; see also [An08] .
φ(k + 1, x 2 , . . . , x n ) = µ[k, φ(k, x 2 , . . . , x n ), x 2 , . . . , x n ] (where ψ, µ have lower rank than s).
. . . we apply the following procedure: one can express the relation x 0 = φ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) with the help of the concept "sequence of numbers" (f )
118 in the following manner:
x 0 = φ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∼ (∃f ){f 0 = ψ(x 2 , . . . , x n ) & (∀k)(k < x 1 → f k+1 = µ(k, f k , x 2 , . . . , x n ) & x 0 = f x1 } If S(y, x 2 , . . . , x n ), T (z, x 1 , . . . , x n+1 ) are the arithmetical relations which, according to the inductive hypothesis, are equivalent to y = ψ(x 2 , . . . , x n ), and z = µ(x 1 , . . . , x n+1 ) respectively, then we have:
Now we replace the concept "sequence of numbers" by "pairs of numbers" by correlating with the number pair n, d the sequence of numbers f (n,d) (f Then:
Lemma 1: If f is an arbitrary sequence of natural numbers and k is an arbitrary natural number, then there exists a pair of natural numbers n, d such that f (n,d) and f coincide in their first k terms.
Proof: Let l be the greatest of the numbers k, f 0 , f 1 , . . . , f k−1 . Determine n so that n ≡ f i [mod (1 + (i + 1)l!)] for i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1, which is possible, since any two of the numbers 1 + (i + 1)l! (i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1) are relatively prime. For, a prime dividing two of these numbers must also divide the difference (i 1 − i 2 )l! and therefore, since i 1 − i 2 < l, must also divide l!, which is impossible. The number pair n, l! fulfills our requirement.
Since the relation x = [n] p is defined by x ≡ n (mod p) & x < p and is therefore arithmetical, then so also is the relation P (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n ) defined as follows:
which, according to (17) and Lemma 1, is equivalent to x 0 = φ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) (in the sequence f in (17) only its values up to the (x + 1)th term matter). Thus, Theorem VII(2) is proved.
Note: Gödel's remark that "in the sequence f in (17) only its values up to the (x + 1)th term matter" is significant for the resolution of the PvNP problem. The proof of Lemma 10-and consequently of Theorem 1 that P =NP if the standard interpretation of PA is sound-depends upon the fact that the equivalence between f (n,d) and f cannot be extended non-terminatingly. A significant point which emerges from the above is that we cannot appeal unrestrictedly to set-theoretical reasoning when studying the foundational framework of PA.
Reason: The language of PA has no constant that interprets in any model of PA as the set N of all natural numbers.
Moreover, the preceding sections show that the Induction Axiom Schema of PA does not allow us to bypass this constraint by introducing an "actual" (or "completed") infinity disguised as an arbitrary constant -usually denoted by c or ∞ -into either the language, or a putative model, of PA.
